More Rare-Earth Metals Companies Doing Deals With US Government

Executive Summary

  • Two U.S. startups manufacturing rare-earth magnets have signed a $1.4 billion deal with the federal government, under the Donald Trump administration, to establish a domestic supply chain of rare-earth magnets—a component critical to EVs, defence, and high-tech manufacturing. wsj.com+1
  • This move is part of a broader strategy to reduce dependence on China’s dominance over the rare-earth magnet and permanent-magnet supply chain, which in turn has major strategic, industrial-and-defence implications. morningstar.com+1
  • For investors, the opportunity zone spans magnet productionrare-earth processingsupply-chain reshoring, and industrial policy-driven growth. Execution risks remain high—timeline, scaling, cost inflation, technical hurdles, and China’s potential response.

What happened (facts)

  • The U.S. Department of Defense (or another federal agency) signed a contract worth about $1.4 billion with two domestic startups focused on rare-earth magnets. The aim: build out domestic capacity and supply for magnets used in defence, EVs, drones, wind turbines. Source: Wall Street Journal, date today. wsj.com
  • China currently dominates the global rare-earth magnet supply chain (estimated >90% in magnets, refining, etc.). This has caused concern in the U.S. and West regarding strategic vulnerability. morningstar.com
  • The deal appears aligned with a U.S. industrial policy push (as noted in White House documentation of “Trump effect” investments). Source: White House, Aug 2025. whitehouse.gov

How we read it (mechanism & context)

  • Strategic supply-chain pivot: By signing large contracts with startups, the U.S. is attempting to “kick-start” domestic capacity for rare-earth magnets—this is a classic industrial-policy intervention.
  • Risk reduction for major industries: Magnets are a key component not only in EVs but in military systems (motors, actuators, missiles), so having secure supply addresses both industrial and defence risk.
  • Potential “first mover” advantage: Startups receiving government backing may gain scale advantages, contracts, production certainty—enabling them to establish costly manufacturing facilities ahead of competition.
  • Execution risk remains substantial: Manufacturing rare-earth magnets at scale is technically and capital-intensive; cost per unit matters; competing with China (which has entrenched supply chains and low cost) is non-trivial.

Investment implications — where we’d look (and why)

1) Rare-earth magnet manufacturers & startups (0-24 months)

  • Thesis: Startups that win government contracts receive “print money” visibility and funding; early mover advantage.
  • Action: Identify those firms (if public) or supply-chain participants (equipment, furnaces, coatings, recycling).
  • Risk: Many are private; execution delays; cost overruns; technology risk.

2) Materials/processing firms upstream (12-48 months)

  • Thesis: To scale magnet production, upstream refining (rare-earth separation, alloys, neodymium/praseodymium) must grow. Firms in that chain may benefit.
  • Action: Screen public companies or private firms in NdPr separation, magnet alloy production, recycling of magnets.
  • Risk: Commodity price volatility; regulatory/environmental risk; China’s response could flood the market and depress margins.

3) Downstream users & strategic hedging (EVs, defence, motors) (12-36 months)

  • Thesis: EV manufacturers, defence primes, motor manufacturers could benefit from more secure magnet supply reducing bottlenecks and cost volatility. Also firms that supply equipment to build magnets may benefit.
  • Action: Evaluate whether such firms highlight “magnet supply chain resilience” as part of their investment case.
  • Risk: If scale-up fails or the deal is delayed, expected benefits may not materialise; alternative technologies (ferrites, induction motors) may reduce magnet intensity.

4) Industrial-policy and export-control beneficiaries (ongoing)

  • Thesis: Because this is a policy-driven play, firms with exposure to U.S. government programmes, export-control resilient supply chains, localization may garner premium.
  • Action: Consider companies listing U.S. government contracts or defence-magnets content; suppliers to magnet manufacturing equipment.
  • Risk: Policy shifts (change in administration) could reduce emphasis; the U.S. may still rely on foreign supply for a while.

Catalysts & Timing

  • Short-term (next 6-12 m): Announcements of which startups won contracts, capital-expansion timelines, funding rounds, site selection, first production volume targets.
  • Medium-term (2026-2028): Ramp-up of domestic magnet manufacturing, order books from EV/defence, reduction in magnet supply bottlenecks, potential margin expansion.
  • Longer-term (2028+): Full domestic magnet supply chain maturity, potential exports, cost parity with China, de-risking of critical-minerals supply.

Scenarios (12-36 months)

  • Base (~55%) — “Gradual build”: The contract kicks off startup builds; domestic capacity grows steadily; supply chain gradually diversifies away from China; margins modest.
  • Bull (~25%) — “Accelerated shift”: Domestic magnet production scales quickly, cost curve falls, major orders from EV/defence accelerate, export markets open, supply bottleneck alleviated; margins widen.
  • Bear (~20%) — “Execution stumble”: Startups encounter technical/cost issues, China floods supply, domestic production lags, marginal cost remains high; buffer gains small; returns delayed.

Risks & What Could Go Wrong

  • Technical/scale risk: Magnet manufacture is complex; achieving high-volume, low-cost production may take much longer than planned.
  • Cost inflation: Raw material (rare-earth oxides), energy, labour, environmental permits may push costs higher than expected.
  • China’s response: China could increase its magnet/rare-earth output or drop prices to protect market share, undermining domestic margin.
  • Policy change: A change in administration or policy priority could reduce government funding or support.
  • Market saturation: If domestic capacity expands ahead of demand growth, prices and margins may compress.

What We’re Watching (KPIs)

  • Names of the startups awarded contracts, their production targets, capex commitments.
  • Domestic rare-earth magnet production volumes (metric tons) and market share by origin over time.
  • Magnet cost per unit trends, margin changes for magnet manufacturers.
  • EV/defence customer order books referencing domestic-supply magnets.
  • China export volumes and pricing for rare-earth magnets (monitor for flood-of-supply risk).

Sources

  • “Rare-Earth Magnet Startups Seal $1.4 Billion Deal With Trump Administration” — Wall Street Journal (Oct 2025). wsj.com
  • “TRUMP EFFECT: A Running List of New U.S. Investment in President Trump’s Second Term” — White House (Aug 2025). whitehouse.gov
  • “America’s Hottest New Investment: Rare-Earth Companies” — Wall Street Journal (Oct 27 2025). wsj.com

Bottom Line

We view this $1.4 billion government-backed rare-earth magnet deal as a significant industrial-policy lever shift: moving from dependence to domestic build-out. The investment opportunity focuses on the supply-chain enablers—magnet production, rare-earth separation, equipment and downstream users—rather than simply the startup headlines. That said, time and execution matter: we’d size exposure modestly, track milestone delivery, and emphasise firms with proven execution and capital can-do.